A STORY OF STRUGGLE AND INTRIGUE IN CENTRAL ASIA

A BOOK entitled "Sturm über Asien, Erlebnisse eines diplomatischen Geheimagenten" (Storm over Asia: Experiences of a Secret Diplomatic Agent), by one Wilhelm Filchner, was published in Berlin in 1924. It was briefly reviewed in the Central Asian Society JOURNAL the same year (Vol. xi., Part iv.).

The writer traces the course of political developments in Central Asia from the end of the last century until 1923, with special regard to the relations of Great Britain, Russia, and China with Tibet. While much has been written on this subject by British writers, the fact that the author of this book is a German, who takes the Russian standpoint, gives it a peculiar interest.

The author prefaces his story by observations on the political awakening of the peoples of Asia as a result of the War, and declares that, though the downfall of Czarist Russia has greatly strengthened England's position in Asia, the end of the War and the formation of the League of Nations has led to a renewal of Anglo-Russian rivalry, which will henceforth be centred in Tibet.

The secret diplomatic agent whose experiences form the theme of the narrative is a certain Zerempil, who, like his master, Aguan Dorji, was a Buriat of Urga. Aguan Dorji is well known to the Foreign Department of the Government of India as Dorjiev, an active agent of Russian policy in Asia. The history of this latter is reviewed by the writer. After education in Buddhist theology, he attained high rank as a Lama; was employed by the Russian Foreign Office and Intelligence Service as long ago as 1885; visited all the capitals of Europe, and became an accomplished diplomat. When the present Dalai Lama came into power at the age of eighteen, it was contrived that Aguan Dorji should become his tutor. He gained his pupil's entire confidence, and was made chief Minister at Lhasa in charge of foreign and financial affairs. In 1900, at the age of fifty-seven, he was received by the Czar at Livadia in the Crimea as emissary of the Dalai Lama. Again, in June, 1901, he visited Peterhof as head of a Tibetan Mission.

Zerempil, the hero of the story, came under the influence of Aguan Dorji at an early age, when serving his novitiate at the Gandan monastery near Urga, and some years later was recommended by his

mentor to the Russian officials who were concerned with the political and military problems of Asia as a likely agent for their purposes. Hence it came about that Zerempil was taken to the Russian Foreign Office in St. Petersburg, then trained in the Indian Section of the General Staff for exploration and intelligence work. As he proved capable and trustworthy, he was sent on secret missions to remote parts of Asia, visiting Calcutta and Peshawar among other places. In January, 1900, at the age of thirty, he was again in Petersburg, and was put under the orders of Colonel Alexander Nikolaevitch Orlov for a special and important task. Indications are given of the elaborate precautions taken by the Russian General Staff to ensure the secrecy of their operations. Colonel Orlov took up residence in the Hotel Europa in the assumed character of a merchant named Bogdanovitch. Here Zerempil, who was ordered to avoid all open relations with military officials, would come secretly to obtain his instructions. In June he started on his mission, travelling disguised as an employee of a Chinese firm of tea merchants in Liang Chao Fu, under the assumed name of Trubchaninov. Zerempil's first destination was Tashkent, where he was to report himself to the Chief of the Staff of the Governor-General of Turkestan. He was informed that the general purport of his mission concerned the Anglo-Indian position along the frontier of Afghanistan, and he was ordered to proceed to Pamirski Post to receive detailed instructions. The account of the journey is given in the form of extracts from Zerempil's diary. He was fitted out with a riding horse, eight pack-horses with ten bales of pressed tea, and an escort of four Jigits.

From railhead at Andijan the party marched by Osh, crossed the Alai Mountains, over the Kizil Art Pass to Karakul Lake, and the Ak Baital Pass to Pamirski Post, which was reached on June 28, 1900. At Pamirski Post, which is described as the outpost for intelligence work to India and Afghanistan, Zerempil found two officers, Lieutenant Ivolgin in command of the post, and another, who was referred to as Professor Stungévitch, a short, keen-featured man, who was in reality the Chief of the Indian Section of the Russian General Staff, on a tour of inspection of the Russian outposts on the northern frontier of India.

While Zerempil is put to study the map of the frontier, this colonel is represented as giving to the commandant an appreciation of the political situation in Asia somewhat as follows:

Our General Staff and Foreign Office have certain aims in Manchuria which we hope to achieve all the sooner now that the Boxer rising has entered upon a phase that will probably lead to international concerted action against China. From this concerted action Russia as well as the United States of America will stand aloof. Nine days ago the German Ambassador in Peking was murdered by

the insurgents. The European Powers and Japan are planning combined punitive action against the Boxers, who naturally oppose the annexation policy of the European and Japanese "parasites." Russia will make use of this opportunity to strengthen her position in Manchuria. In Central Asia the Indian question engages our closest attention, and our chief aim is to drive our old rival, England, out of her Indian possessions. Before we can attain this end we must occupy the outworks of India. India is like a fortress, protected by the sea on two sides, and by a mountain rampart on the third. Beyond this natural rampart stretches a glacis of varying extent: it comprises Siam, Tibet, Pamir, Afghanistan, Persia, and Baluchistan. We Russians must get a firm footing upon this glacis before we can advance to the attack on the main Indian position. England has long been aware of the menace of our advance, and takes every opportunity to thwart it by establishing friendly relations with the peoples of the glacis regions.

For our Turkestan troops the north and west parts of the glacis are, of course, the most important; and the strategic lines of approach, especially the railways. England knows the advantage that Russia has in the Trans-Caspian railway—Krasnovodsk-Merv-Bokhara-Samarkand-Tashkent-Kokand-Andijan—soon to be joined up to the Orenburg-Tashkent line. Two main lines of advance lead to the Afghan frontier from this railway.

First, the railway from Merv to Khushk, where railway material is ready for an extension to Herat, which can be done in three weeks.

Secondly, the railway now under construction from Katta Kurgan to Karshi, whence the Afghan frontier can be reached by four roads:

Kerki to Maimana;
Kilif to Mazari Sharif;
Kilif to Pattar Hissar;
Hissar to Faizabad.

The English are well aware of the strength of our position. They reckon with the fact that we can occupy Herat before they could occupy Kandahar. They know also that the seizure of Herat would lay open to us the way to Kandahar and Kabul. They also know that it would be very risky for an Anglo-Indian force of any considerable strength to oppose a united Russo-Afghan army with the difficult Suliman range in its rear. The tribes west of the Indus are in great measure hostile to the British, so that the Indian Government would first have to bring these tribes into subjection. The British, conscious of their unfavourable strategical situation, are striving to improve and broaden their base in the South Afghanistan and Persian frontier regions. To this end the Quetta-Nushki railway is to be begun in August, 1902, and work has already been begun upon the extension towards Kandahar of the strategic railway Ruk-Shikapur-Sibi-Quetta-

Chaman, one of the greatest mountain railways in the world. England would by these means be enabled to move large forces into Southern Afghanistan from her base on the Indus.

It must be remarked that Nushki is only 230 kilometres from the Persian frontier, and the most likely line for railway connection between India and Persia, by Quetta-Nushki-Seistan, might lead on to junction with the Baghdad railway; also to the English constructing without much difficulty a railway by Kerman, Yezd, Kashan, to Teheran. The Quetta-Nushki line would thus form the first part of a railway that would bring the English on to the flank of the Russian line of advance against India. Russia would have to overtrump such a move by a strategic railway through Persia to the Persian Gulf from Ashqabad, though its construction would be extremely difficult and costly, as the line would cross all the mountain ranges of Western Persia at right angles. England meanwhile is determined at all costs to maintain her supremacy in Southern Persia. As England is thus strategically superior in the South Afghanistan-Baluchistan zone, we must find means to get the upper hand in other parts, especially with regard to the main approaches from India to Afghanistan; from Peshawar by the Khyber Pass to Kabul, and from Thal by the Kurram to Kabul. Measures have already been taken against the line Peshawar-Chitral-Faizabad-Hissar. As regards the routes to Kashmir, by the Khorabohrt, Killik, and Mintaka Passes towards Gilgit, we will do nothing, partly because they are by nature impracticable for troops in any force, also because we want to keep them clear for our agents.

We have successfully hampered the Quetta railway construction project, and are now taking similar measures with regard to the Khyber and Kurram roads. Steps have also been taken to win over the tribes of Swat and Bajaur.

Operations against the Indian-Afghan frontier south of and including the Peshawar-Kabul line are assigned to the 2nd Army Corps in Ashqabad; all the north to the 1st Army Corps in Tashkent. From the latter place special instructions have been sent to Pamirski Post, and these are now supplemented by a charge from the General Staff to you as Commandant to facilitate for one of our best agents named Zerempil the crossing of the Indian frontier south of the Pamirs, and help him in every way to perform his task, which is in close relation to previous instructions.

On completion of this review of the situation Zerempil was called in and his special task explained to him, together with a statement of the general scheme of which it formed a part. The most secret details were omitted, not for lack of confidence in Zerempil, but lest by any chance through his capture the English might gain possession of them.

The task now given to Zerempil was to march via Kizil Rabat to the Russo-Afghan frontier, and along it to the Bijik Pass. To this

point a Cossack escort would be provided. Then through Chinese territory to the Mintaka Pass, and by Misgar, Hunza, and Gilgit to Peshawar. From the last Russian outpost, Istik, a trusted guide would accompany him to the Indian frontier, where he would be met by other guides. He was warned to be cautious on the Karachukkur route, as there were Indian relay posts at Gilgit, Tashkurgan, and Kashgar. A certain Sher Mahomed was named as an agent in Gilgit who would help with transport to Peshawar. On arrival in Peshawar, Zerempil was to deliver at a given address explosives and pamphlets which were hidden in the bales of tea. The explosives were for use in the rising of the tribes of Swat and Bajaur. Further detailed instructions were to be obtained from one William Jones, agent of the Russian General Staff in Peshawar. All necessary papers for the journey in the assumed character were made out in the name of Li, in the service of the Chinese tea merchants Fei of Suchow. Zerempil's arrival in Peshawar was timed for the end of August, 1900, so that the rising in Bajaur and Swat could be brought about at the end of September, and would coincide with another Russian undertaking against Chitral by the Baroghil Pass, the Yarkand River, and Mastuj.

An account of the journey is then given, again in the form of extracts from Zerempil's diary. He describes crossing the Kizil Rabat and Bijik Passes, and being conducted by a friendly Hunza tribesman across the Indian frontier. The author then remarks that the courage and endurance that such a task involves remains necessarily unknown to the public in general, and only very few persons were aware that two short notices which appeared in *The Times* at the end of October, 1901, were closely connected with Zerempil's enterprise. One was from Bombay: "The rising of the tribes of Bajaur and Swat has been suppressed."

The other from Peshawar: "A magazine in the Chitral military area has blown up, probably from spontaneous combustion."

The writer now goes on to tell of very strained relations between England and Russia resulting from the capture by the British of certain secret agents of Russia who were concerned in the above-mentioned rising, one of them a man of Hunza who had long been wanted, and who admitted to being a Russian spy. The conflict was sharp in Parliament and in the Press. A note states that in the spring of 1901 Russia had 30,000 men at Khushk and 20,000 at Tashkent. Russia, of course, denied her agents, and, far from yielding anything, increased her activity and espionage. The Indian Government was compelled to take counter measures, sending "Pundits" on secret service to Russian and Chinese Turkestan, and taking other precautions.

It was now too that Russia began to actively concern herself with the Indo-Tibetan frontier as another vulnerable point, knowing through

the Indian branch of the General Staff that relations between the British Government and Tibet were very strained. The problem was very different from that of India's north-western frontier with the Russians in touch on the Pamir. Tibet was separated from Russian Siberia by the Gobi desert, while India immediately bordered upon the populous part of Tibet with Lhasa the capital, though the great obstacle of the Himalayas stood between. The British, having developed trade routes over the passes, had means of access which gave them a great advantage over the Russians. Nevertheless the Operations Department of the Russian General Staff was not to be deterred from making trouble on this frontier too. It was decided to strengthen the Tibetan Government against the British by supplying them with arms. Again the energetic Colonel Orlov, of the Russian General Staff, was selected for the duty of transporting arms from Urga to Lhasa. Two caravans were organized; the larger, with 200 camel loads of rifles, was conducted by Colonel Orlov himself, with some officers of the espionage bureau of the General Staff. It was declared to be a scientific expedition, and marched from Urga through the Gobi, by Tsaidam and the Tong La to Lhasa.

Another caravan was entrusted to Zerempil, to proceed from Urga via Kuku Nor, Tosson Nor, and Oring Nor to Lhasa. His party numbered forty, including twenty Cossacks, and they had fifty-five horses and 200 yaks laden with rifles and ammunition and small mountain guns. Zerempil travelled under an assumed name as a Mongol merchant.

In his account of the difficulties and hardships of the long march the author evidently strays from the path of history into the region of romance. He describes a series of adventures with the sensationalism of a film producer. In all of these Zerempil is the hero, especially as a sportsman with the rifle, although an orthodox Buddhist of high-priestly rank! In the end he reaches Lhasa with a depleted caravan on November 12, 1902, where Orlov had arrived before him.

Here Zerempil found his old master Aguan Dorji as War Minister actively engaged in organizing for war with the British, and arranging for the transport of arms to Nepal. Under his orders Zerempil started a factory of Martini Henry rifles, jingals, etc. To the activities of these two men is ascribed the development of a situation which at length led to armed intervention by the Government of India to re-establish their waning influence in Tibet. It is recalled that the Indian Foreign Department had maintained almost unbroken touch since 1866 with affairs in Lhasa and Tibet by the sending of agents such as Pundits A. K. and Nain Singh, by Montgomery's reports, and other sources. Latterly the Government of India had been kept well informed about Russian aims, and knew that the agent of their active Tibetan policy, Aguan Dorji, was a formidable opponent. It was he who as adviser to

the Dalai Lama had persuaded the Tibetan Government to refuse to recognize the agreement between Great Britain and China regulating commercial relations with Tibet, and he was chiefly instrumental in concluding a secret treaty between Russia and Tibet. In addition to all this, certain Englishmen who entered Tibet were held prisoners. Letters of protest from the Government of India to the Dalai Lama in 1900 and 1901 were at Aguan Dorji's instance returned unopened. The journeys of this latter to Livadia and Peterhof, together with his personal influence over the Dalai Lama, must be regarded as closely connected with the acquisition by Russia of complete ascendancy in Tibet to the exclusion of Great Britain. In 1902 England made strong representations to the Government of China, knowing that they would not willingly acquiesce in such interference with their authority over Tibet. This step, however, had no real effect. It became known that a secret treaty had been concluded between Russia and Tibet, and the Raja of Nepal informed the Government of India that the Dalai Lama had called upon him for armed support in action against them. Under such circumstances a declaration was made by the British Foreign Secretary in Parliament on February 18, 1903, as follows:

"Lhasa is situated close to the northern frontier of India, and more than 1,600 miles from the Asiatic dominions of Russia. The sudden interest of Russia in these regions immediately bordering on British territory cannot fail to exercise a disturbing influence upon the inhabitants of that territory, or to create the impression that British influence was giving way to the advance of Russian influence in regions where the latter had hitherto been unknown. Our Government has even been informed of the conclusion of an agreement by Russia for the establishment of a protectorate over Tibet."

This warning had no effect in checking the activity of Russia through Aguan Dorji, but to preserve an appearance of right the Russian Ambassador on April 8 made a communication to Lord Lansdowne denying the existence of any agreement about Tibet or any intention on the part of Russia of interfering with Tibet, but declaring that the Russian Government could not remain indifferent to a serious disturbance of the existing situation in that country, and in the event of such disturbance might be compelled to take such steps as they thought fit to defend her interests.

Lord Lansdowne replied to the effect that the proximity of Tibet to India made it unavoidable that the Government of India should exercise some influence in that country, and that while there was no thought of annexation, Great Britain would stand by her treaty rights. As a sequel to this declaration the British Mission under Colonel Younghusband crossed the frontier to Khamba Jong in July, 1903, for the purpose of coming to an understanding with the Dalai Lama. The story is told of the evasions and prevarications with which the

Mission was met by both Tibetans and Chinese, until in November, 1903, the Government of India decided that nothing could be effected otherwise than by a resort to force. The brigade under General Macdonald was therefore mobilized to occupy the Chumbi Valley, with Colonel Younghusband in political charge. The Russian Ambassador in London was notified of this decision by Lord Lansdowne on November 7, and at the same time informed that the action rendered inevitable by the attitude of the Tibetans was not to lead to a prolonged occupation of their territory or interference in their affairs.

The formal ground for the despatch of the expedition was the non-fulfilment of the treaty concluded between Great Britain and China in Calcutta in 1890, especially as regarded the clauses that required all fortifications between the Indian frontier and Gyantse to be demolished, and that forbade the transfer of any Tibetan territory to a foreign Power without the consent of Great Britain.

Russia, taken aback by the unexpected action of Great Britain, could only meet it by violent protests through her Ambassador in London. Lord Lansdowne's reply was prompt and to the effect that it was strange that such protests should come from a Power which had repeatedly annexed the territory of its neighbours on the lightest excuses, and that if Russia had a right to complain of England invading Tibetan territory to obtain satisfaction for flagrant breaches of good faith, how much more would England be justified in complaining of Russia's aggressions in Manchuria, Turkestan, and Persia!

The British Government was able to act with all the more confidence in the knowledge that the increasing acuteness of the Manchurian and Korean questions must soon involve Russia in conflict with Japan, and effectually divert the former from opposition to the British in Tibet.

The Russian Government, being unable to actively support the Tibetans herself, gave urgent instructions to Aguan Dorji to organize defensive measures against the British from Lhasa. He sent Zerempil to Phari with orders to arrange for getting information and to put any difficulties he could in the way of the British advance. On December 18, 1903, Zerempil reported that British forces had crossed the frontier by the Jelap La on the 11th and 12th and were advancing on Yatung. On the 19th Phari was evacuated under Zerempil's direction before the advancing enemy.

On January 8, 1904, the Tibetan advanced guard was driven back from Tuna. It was Zerempil who sent a deputation on January 23 to the British Commander at Phari demanding his withdrawal, and warning him of what awaited him if he ventured upon a further advance. His emissaries reported the British entrenched at Phari, awaiting reinforcements and more clement weather. The resumption of the British advance at the end of March was followed by the defeat

of Zerempil's troops at Guru with a loss of 300 killed. Their failure is attributed to their being armed with muzzle-loaders, flintlocks, spears, swords and shields, bows and arrows; the troops armed with modern rifles being kept back at Gyantse Jong for the defence of the main position at Tsechen, covering the junction of roads to Shigatse on the one hand, and Lhasa on the other. Zerempil is now represented as preparing this main position for defence. It is described as a strong position on a ridge 600 yards long crowned by the Fort, with the village behind in the valley and the Tsechen monastery beyond. On April 11 the British Commander sent a demand to the Chinese General Ma in command of the troops to surrender. On his refusal, the English are said to have seized him as a hostage, whereupon, contrary to Zerempil's will, the position was surrendered.

The story goes on to relate that on May 3 two-thirds of the British force with all the guns and machine-guns marched away from Chang La, the British camp south of Tsechen, to seize the Kharo Pass on the road to Lhasa. Zerempil seized the opportunity to attack the weak remainder at Chang La on May 5, compelling them to retreat to the so-called "Citadel," where they resisted desperately "to escape threatened annihilation, falling into the hands of the Tibetans and being cut to pieces." While the British recalled some of their troops from the Kharo Pass, Zerempil received reinforcements from Shigatse. In response to his call to a holy war to defend the sacred city of Lhasa, supports poured in from all parts, especially from Kam, and Mongols from the north.

Thus strengthened Zerempil attacked Gyantse on May 3, and made attempts to raid the British communications. Although unsuccessful in these attempts, Zerempil is represented as defending the Jong with 7,000 Tibetans against Macdonald's attack on June 28.

After a sanguinary conflict Zerempil sued for an armistice till the 30th. A graphic account is given of the renewal of the attack, and the prolonged defence by the Tibetans, until on July 6 the explosion of the magazine in the Fort put an end to the defence.

Zerempil, gathering what troops he could, hastened to Lhasa to stand by the Dalai Lama and prevent his falling into the hands of the British. In the Po-ta-la, "the Vatican of the Dalai Lama," everything was ready for his flight via Tengri Nor to Urga. When General Macdonald at the head of the British troops entered Lhasa on August 3 the Dalai Lama had fled, accompanied by Aguan Dorji, the arch-enemy of the British, and Zerempil. Pursuit was useless, for elaborate precautions had been taken to ensure secrecy as to the direction taken. Any attempt would have to be made in considerable force owing to the hostility of the Lamas and the people.

As there was no one with whom to negotiate, the British Commander was in a dilemma. At length, on August 20, Tipa Rimpoche

was induced to come from Kaldan and endeavour to set up a provisional Government.

The Tashi Lama was to be the head, with Tipa Rimpoche and the Chinese Amban as members.

The Tashi Lama, though a respected religious leader, was quite inexperienced in political matters. Tipa Rimpoche was a trusted Minister of the Dalai Lama, who had entrusted him with the great seal of State, but with strict injunctions that under no circumstances was he to use it. The Amban was a man without any great standing or influence. Macdonald (instead of Younghusband) is represented as negotiating with these three, and finding no difficulty in imposing his will upon them. The result was a new treaty entirely to the advantage of the British. The conditions need not be recapitulated here. The writer sarcastically remarks that the signing of this "Treaty of Peace and Friendship" made Tibet the vassal of England.

The Chinese Government protested, recalled the incapable Amban, declared the Dalai Lama dethroned, and transferred the direction of the mundane affairs of Tibet to the Tashi Lama and his officials. The British Expedition started on the return march to India on September 23, 1904. This chapter concludes with remarks upon the greatly enhanced prestige of Great Britain in the eyes of Asiatics as a result of the occupation of Lhasa, and upon the shifting of the political centre of Central Asia from the Pamir to Tibet.

(*To be continued.*)

NOTE AFTER GOING TO PRESS.—In connection with the foregoing story, special interest attaches to a message from the British Resident in Sikkim which appeared in *The Times* on August 30, and has now been confirmed in *The Times* of September 20. It reports the murder in June of this year by Lamas in Eastern Tibet of a party of missionaries who were within ten marches of Lhasa, on their way from Western Khansu to seek safety in India. The names are given as Mr. Mathewson, of the China Inland Mission, an American named Plymer, *and a German scientist named Filchner.* There seems to be no doubt that this last was the author of the story of Zerempil. Reference to the Berlin "Who's Who" shows Wilhelm Filchner to have been born in 1877; attached to the Great General Staff as a Captain; retired from the army and became a traveller and explorer; visited the Pamirs in 1900; led a German-Tibet expedition in 1903, an Antarctic expedition in 1910-12; was to have accompanied Amundsen on his North Polar Expedition, but was prevented by the outbreak of the war. The record begins again in 1920 with the enumeration of Filchner's works, including mapping of North-East Tibet and parts of China.

A STORY OF STRUGGLE AND INTRIGUE IN CENTRAL ASIA

(Continued)

II

THE narrative now follows the Dalai Lama on his flight to Urga. News of the battle of Liao Yang met him in Kuku Nor, and, greatly perturbed by the course of the Russo-Japanese War, he hastened to Urga to consult his old adviser, Aguan Dorji, under whose guidance he had followed the pro-Russian policy which had now led to the occupation of Lhasa by the British, while the Russians were suffering humiliating defeats at the hands of the Japanese.

The Dalai Lama was further informed that the Peking Government was about to send Tang Chao Ki, the Taotai of Tientsin, on a special mission to Lhasa. Though this able man was a sworn foe of the British, the Dalai Lama well knew that the news boded ill for the supremacy of his hierarchy in Tibet, and that China meant to take full advantage of the situation which his mistaken policy had brought about. He must watch closely further developments in Peking. The Gandan monastery near Urga seemed the most favourable retreat from which to observe in security and secrecy. The caravan route to Peking on the one hand went thence via Kaldan; on the other hand, the Siberian railway was within reach via Kiakhta. The telegraph at the last-named place would give him the news from the Russian side, while he could count upon the Japanese keeping him informed of the situation from their point of view.

As the Dalai Lama's caravan traversed Central Asia, the faithful came in crowds to do him fervent homage. They were loud in expressions of anger against the British for their profanation of holy Lhasa, and of contempt for the Chinese.

Zerempil, who had accompanied his master, was now sent to Kumbum monastery in order from that centre to prepare the ground in Eastern Tibet for active resistance to Chinese designs. The Dalai Lama issued a secret decree to the monasteries, Kumbum, Labrang, Litang, Batang, and others, calling upon all to oppose Chinese invasion.

Meanwhile, he continued the journey through the Gobi desert. The news of his approach spread like wildfire, and pilgrims of every

degree flocked into Urga to worship the incarnation of Buddha and to receive his blessing. The arrival at Gandan monastery on November 27, 1904, was an occasion for great rejoicing. Aguan Dorji was the first to welcome his former pupil.

In the spring of 1905, about the time when the Russians were finally defeated at Mukden, the first results of Zerempil's activities on the borderland between Kuku Nor and Yunnan became apparent. The Dalai Lama had been formally deposed by the Chinese, but this fact troubled him not at all, for he felt confident of the success of the revolt which Zerempil was preparing.

Aguan Dorji had obtained a large supply of Russian and Japanese arms, and had sent them through the Gobi to Eastern Tsaidam. He had also contrived to divert to Tsaidam Russian deserters and others capable of employment as military instructors. Zerempil, in the guise of a devout "Geslong" Lama, had been intriguing in Siningfu unsuspected by the Chinese authorities. The Amban maintained intimate relations with Kumbum monastery, and even passed on to them all news received from the Russo-Japanese theatre of war through the telegraph office at Lan Chow Fu. Zerempil was thus kept well informed. Kumbum was an excellent centre for his activities. The sanctity of the monastery attracted vast numbers of pilgrims from all parts. It is also a centre of caravan routes from Kashgar, Urga, and Peking, as well as from Szechuen, Lhasa, and Tsaidam.

Under Aguan Dorji's instructions, Zerempil co-operated secretly with the Abbot of the monastery in the working out of his plans, while making his intimate relations with his brother Lamas a cloak for his political activities.

A digression from the story is here made to give an interesting description of life in the great Kumbum monastery, and of Zerempil's share in it as a Lama of high dignity. An account is given of the training of a Lama from his novitiate through the various grades; the rules and restrictions and the duties of each grade; the administration and discipline of the monastery and the daily routine; the practice of medicine and the various industries in which the monks are employed; their food; the asceticism of some and the loose living of others; method of disposal of the dead; and, lastly, the chief festivals of the year.

Aguan Dorji regarded as of primary importance for the success of the revolt, first to secure the support of the Muhammadan population; and, secondly, to keep the Chinese in ignorance of the plans till the last moment.

After the suppression of the Muhammadan revolt of 1861-73 many thousands of Muhammadans had fled to Tibet and Turkestan; they, and others of their faith who had migrated from China, and from Russian Turkestan, had been well received; some had married Tibetan

wives, and been admitted into Tibetan communities. Many Muhammadan merchants trade between Kuku Nor, Tsaidam, Szechuen, and Eastern Tibet. Aguan Dorji hoped now to win over such men to help with the transport of arms, for intelligence work, or even actively to co-operate in the revolt. Zerempil worked to effect a reconciliation between the Muhammadans and the Lama priesthood. It was not an easy task, for the Muhammadan attack on Kumbum monastery in 1860 was still remembered; an attack made in revenge for armed assistance given by the Lamas to the Chinese in the suppression of the Muhammadan revolt. The Muhammadans, too, remembered the alliance between the Chinese and the Lamas of Kumbum against them in 1895. Still Zerempil succeeded after many vain attempts in allaying their hostility, persuading them that the help given by Kumbum to the Chinese was against the will of the Abbot, and that the real sympathies of Lhasa and of Tibet had been on the side of the Muhammadans. Zerempil was also able to cement good relations between the Tibetan frontier tribes and the monasteries, frustrating Chinese policy which aimed at promoting discord between these tribes and the Lamas. He established communication with all the great Lamaserais, especially those of Labrang and Quetta, and secured their adherence to the movement of revolt.

It was important that there should be no open action until the transport of arms into the region north of Yunnan had been completed; the arms caravans from Urga should, if all went well, reach the neighbourhood of Batang in the early autumn. There was ground for anxiety in this respect, for Zerempil had so worked up the hatred of his Lama brethren for the Chinese, that it was doubtful whether they would restrain themselves till the time was ripe. China, too, after the Russian debacle in Manchuria, had come into closer relations with the British, and might well be expected to make use of the changed circumstances to strengthen her position in Central Asia by tightening her hold upon Tibet. It was even rumoured that a special Chinese envoy was on his way from Peking to Lhasa. Zerempil was further disquieted by news from Urga of an Anglo-Japanese rapprochement which eventually led to the conclusion on August 12, 1905, of a defensive alliance, which was primarily directed against Russia. There had been many Japanese travellers in Central Asia of late, and Zerempil knew that their influence would be all against Russia, and probably against anti-Chinese agitation in Eastern Tibet. Many Japanese had visited Kumbum itself in the guise of traders, explorers, and Lamas, and it was now reported that a Japanese Lama of special distinction was about to make a prolonged visit to the monastery. It was thought advisable that Urga and Kumbum should conduct their relations with China through the Amban at Siningfu, rather than through the Amban at Lhasa, as the latter was liable to be influenced by the British.

The Chinese claimed authority over the tribes of North-Eastern Tibet, and made a point of maintaining friendly relations with Kumbum monastery.

The Amban of Siningfu, on paying his annual visit of ceremony to the monastery, was received with all due honour, and departed free from suspicion of the plot that was being hatched against his country. Outwardly all seemed well, but under the surface there was mistrust and suspicion. In April (1905) Zerempil was startled by news of the hasty execution of a Lama and two Muhammadan merchants by the Chinese in Siningfu. He immediately connected the incident with discovery of his plans, but, to his relief, it proved to be an outcome of long-standing strife between the Chinese officials and the monastery of Quetta, in the course of which eight Lamas of high rank had been treacherously murdered by a brutal Chinese Governor, and the monks had retaliated. Still, disquieting rumours came in of movements of Chinese troops which might well betoken preparations to forestall the Dalai Lama's plot, and Zerempil did all he could to hasten the transport of arms to Batang. Into this highly charged atmosphere came like a bolt from the blue the news, in May, 1905, that the Chinese special envoy, Feng by name, had been shot near Batang by men of that place, led by monks of "the black monastery." Feng had travelled quietly and rapidly from Peking to Chungking, and had started thence to reach Lhasa by forced marches, via Tatsienlu, Batang, and Tsiamdo. Zerempil knew that this event would be the signal for a general rising of the Eastern Tibetans against the Chinese. This premature outbreak threatened the success of all his plans, but nothing could be done to control it, and he could only hope for the best. For the Chinese, too, the assassination of one of their highest dignitaries could only mean war on Eastern Tibet. Zerempil, in consultation with the Abbot of Kumbum, decided to restrain the monasteries in Amdo and on the upper Ma Chu-Hoang Ho from participating in the rising till fuller news was received, and a report in this sense was sent to Dorji in Urga.

The revolt spread rapidly from Batang towards Litang and Tsiamdo: the mountain tribes in the south had joined, and a general massacre of Chinese had begun. Activity prevailed in the Chinese frontier towns, Tatsienlu, Siningfu, and Lanchowfu, but Zerempil well knew that the great difficulties of the country prohibited any rapid advance of Chinese forces.

The Chinese Government entrusted to an energetic general named Chao the task of suppressing the revolt and exacting retribution for the murder of their envoy. They ordered the extermination of men, women, and children in the Batang district. Chao collected two brigades in Szechuen, and advanced by Tatsienlu upon Litang, defeated the insurgents, and marched on to Batang, capturing and destroying the monasteries of the district. In order to create a secure base for

further operations, he settled Chinese colonists in the depopulated lands of Batang and Litang, and instituted Chinese administration. He aimed, by gradual annexation, to secure command of the Szechuen-Lhasa road, and by driving a wedge into the insurgent country, to deal in turn with the districts to north and south. Few of the tribal population and of the Lamas escaped west towards Lhasa, or to inaccessible valleys among the mountains; most succumbed to hunger or to wild beasts. Only in the south, near the Yunnan border, between the Yangtse and the Yalung, did a few brave men offer prolonged resistance to Chao's relentless pursuit, defending remote monasteries among the precipitous mountains. The last of such monasteries to fall was Sang Pi Ling. Zerempil warned the monasteries, Kumbum, Quetta, Labrang, and the rest, to hold aloof and to show an outwardly friendly and submissive attitude to the Chinese until preparations were complete. The arms caravans had now reached Western Tsaidam, and been entrusted to the ruler of Haidshar.

In June, 1905, news had reached Kumbum of the Japanese naval victory of Tsushima. The Russian Empire was compelled to enter into the negotiations which led to the peace of Portsmouth on September 5, 1905. At the same time the Abbot of Kumbum underwent the humiliation of visiting Siningfu to pay his respects to the Amban as the representative of China, and as administrator of North-Eastern Tibet.

The record is here interrupted by a graphic account of the defence of the monastery of Sang Pi Ling. The place is described as an inaccessible spot in the wild mountain region between the upper Yangtse and the Yalung, a sort of eagle's nest perched upon a precipitous height in the fork of two tributary streams which rush down parallel rocky ravines to join the Yangtse; the only approach by a narrow, dangerous track along the crest of the lofty range between the two ravines. The chapter opens with a description of the flight of the last survivors of Batang late in July, 1905, to this refuge, mercilessly pursued by Chao's troops up to the entrance of the perilous defile which led to the monastery gate. All through the winter, and into the spring of 1906, the Lamas maintained an heroic defence. Though they were reduced to terrible straits by famine and disease, their Chinese besiegers also suffered the greatest hardships from the difficulties of supply and the severity of the climate in the lofty, inhospitable mountains. The defence was ably conducted by the valiant Prior, who knew the methods of modern warfare, having taken part in the defence of Gyantse against the English. In the end it was only by stratagem that the Chinese gained an entrance, having disguised themselves as a relief column expected by the defenders from another Lamaserai. After a final desperate struggle within the walls, the inmates were all put to death.

After the fall of Sang Pi Ling, General Chao extinguished all remain-

ing embers of revolt, and the Dalai Lama saw that it was hopeless at present to pursue his policy in Eastern Tibet. Russia, on whose support he so much relied, was out of the field; the Anglo-Japanese treaty made a combination which dominated Central Asia; and now followed the treaty between China and Japan of December 22, 1905.

China had hitherto refused to recognize the Treaty concluded between England and Tibet in Lhasa in 1904, but as a sequel to the Anglo-Japanese alliance, China and England had been so far drawn together that by April 27, 1906, it was found possible to come to a definite agreement. China recognized the Anglo-Tibetan Treaty of 1904, while Great Britain bound herself not to annex any Tibetan territory, nor to interfere in any way in the administration of Tibet. The Chinese Government on their part bound themselves not to allow any interference by other foreign powers, granted the right of establishing telegraphic communication between India and Tibet, and concurred in the opening of trade marts at Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok. China also confirmed the undertaking that no concessions should be granted to any foreign powers so long as Great Britain was not in enjoyment of similar privileges. The Peking Government did not hesitate to make use of the free hand given to them by this treaty. They extended the powers of the Amban in Lhasa, strengthened their garrisons in Tibet, and settled hundreds of thousands of Chinese in the newly annexed province of Eastern Tibet. At the same time they decided to restore the Dalai Lama and permit his return to Lhasa. The Dalai Lama judged it best to take the proffered hand, but not to return to Lhasa until he had first visited Peking to ask for full restoration of his independence, which China was now doing so much to curtail. He thought it advisable ostensibly to break off relations with Russia, and for the time being to part with Aguan Dorji. At the end of 1907 he left his place of residence near the Russo-Mongolian frontier and moved to neutral ground at Kumbum, in order to go from there to Peking when the right time should come, provided that in the meantime Zerempil could assure him that his intrigues had remained undiscovered.

The Chinese Government took the opportunity of the Dalai Lama's journey to Kumbum to treat him with every honour and distinction. His great influence over the peoples of Central Asia as head of the Buddhist faith made it necessary for them to conciliate him. A special official was sent all the way from Peking to organize a welcome at Siningfu, and an escort to conduct the Dalai Lama to Kumbum. When the Chinese officials took up their residence in Kumbum, and continued their attentions to him there, the Dalai Lama no longer attempted to conceal his resentment at the supervision and espionage which these attentions implied. He was more than ever resolved to free himself from the hated Chinese yoke. In the meantime he approved Zerempil's action in keeping the mona-

steries in check, and maintaining outward semblance of friendship to China until the time should be ripe. The Dalai Lama reckoned upon the support of Japan in thwarting China's attempt to dominate Tibet. He knew that Japan aimed at hegemony in Asia, and would oppose any strengthening of China's position. In view of the close relations between Japan and Great Britain, he believed that he could count upon the tacit support of the latter also. By the Anglo-Russian agreement, concluded on August 30, 1907, the supremacy of China over Tibet was again recognized. He believed that this fact would encourage the Peking Government to order General Chao to press on to Lhasa, and knew that the latter in his advance would have an ever-lengthening vulnerable line of communication through difficult country, and that therein would be Tibet's opportunity to inflict a crushing defeat upon him.

There is here a footnote by the German author on the Anglo-Russian agreement. It is to the effect that the treaty marked a turning-point in the history of nations, bringing to an end the long-standing rivalry between England and Russia, and setting both nations free to deal with the common threat of Germany's competition. France, too, was interested in this agreement, linking up in her political outlook the question of Tibet, Persia, and Afghanistan with that of Alsace-Lorraine. In fact, this treaty was a prelude to the Great War, and a first step in the encirclement of Germany, the next step being the Anglo-Franco-Russian entente concluded in June, 1908.

The Japanese Lama before-mentioned was now at Labrang monastery, and the Dalai Lama seems to have learnt that he was a personage of such influence that arrangements might be made through him for Japanese support of his plans against China; he hoped, too, to secure English support through the mediation of Japan. Zerempil was accordingly entrusted with the mission of seeking out the Lama and establishing confidential relations with him. Mixing with the pilgrim caravans from foreign parts, he overheard talk of a distinguished Lama from distant Japan who had recently arrived to do homage to the head of his faith, and learnt that he had left Labrang for Kumbum to be in time for the Dalai Lama's entry there. Throughout the day Zerempil watched the stream of pilgrims entering the great gate of Kumbum, but without finding the object of his search. He then joined the pilgrim throng and went in with them to the Golden Roof Temple, the innermost sanctuary of Kumbum, the chief shrine of Eastern Tibet and the ultimate destination of all the pilgrims. Here, too, he failed to find the object of his search, and giving up the quest for the day, passed on at nightfall to his quarters in the Dalai Lama's palace. In the crowd that stood before the house Zerempil was addressed by a foreign Lama asking him if he knew at what time the Dalai

Lama would show himself to pilgrims next day. Zerempil instinctively recognized in this man the object of his search. Courteously greeting him, he offered to arrange for him to see the incarnation of Buddha next day. The stranger expressed his thanks, gave his name as Teramoto, and agreed to meet Zerempil next morning. Zerempil entered and reported his success to his master. Next morning the two met at the holy tree in the monastery, and Zerempil was greatly impressed by the knowledge and culture of his new acquaintance. He had visited all the great Tibetan monasteries and was deeply versed in Buddhist lore. He related the history of Tsong Kapa, the Buddhist reformer so deeply revered in Tibet. Tradition relates that Tsong Kapa derived inspiration from "a long-nosed teacher from the far West." As Tibetans call Europeans in general "long-nosed," it is suggested that this teacher was one of the early Catholic missionaries, and that his teaching has influenced the religious forms of Buddhism in Tibet ever since—*e.g.*, the hierarchical organization, the ceremonial of worship, the sacred implements, holy water, incense, rosaries and candles.

Zerempil arranged that the meeting with the Dalai Lama should be in the library of the monastery. He accordingly took Teramoto there, drawing his attention to a book which set forth the political interests which China had in the maintenance of the office of the Dalai Lama. Over the perusal of this book they were revealing to one another their political concerns, when the Dalai Lama entered. Both prostrated themselves, and received his blessing. The Dalai Lama, seeing the open book, renewed the interrupted discussion, found that Teramoto besides being an exemplary Lama had a profound knowledge of Central Asian politics, had received a thorough diplomatic training, and was naturally tactful and honourable. He could read and write Chinese, English and French. He was a man of great influence with the Government of Japan in Tokio, and had himself been instrumental in effecting the restitution of the Dalai Lama by the Chinese Government who had deposed him in 1904. He had also had a hand in bringing about better relations between the Government of India and Tibet. From February, 1908, he became the Dalai Lama's confidential adviser.

In the meantime General Chao had been consolidating his position in Eastern Tibet, and continued to do so in spite of the revolt which broke out in Yunnan in April, 1908. Instead of pushing forward to Lhasa, and so exposing his troops to counter attack as the Dalai Lama hoped, he acted with the greatest caution, only advancing a step at a time, constructing roads, bridges, and telegraphs, making fortified camps, developing the country, and carefully organizing his line of communications. The Dalai Lama thus had no opportunity for successful military action against the Chinese invaders, but diplomatically his position was so much improved (not least as a result of

Teramoto's skill) that he ventured to carry out his long contemplated visit to Peking to reassert his claims there.

Travelling in company with the Abbot of Kumbum, he reached Peking in October, 1908, was received with great honour, and was allotted the "Yellow Temple" as a residence. His demands from the Government of China included aid for the exclusion of foreign interference in Tibet, reference of the frontier question between India and Tibet to the Hague Conference, and that no important step should be taken by the Chinese Resident in Lhasa in negotiation with foreign powers without his consent. All was going well, and the Dalai Lama was about to negotiate for recognition of complete autonomy in Lhasa, when all was brought to a stop by the sudden death of the Emperor and the Empress Mother. Under the altered circumstances it was useless for the Dalai Lama to remain in Peking, and, acting on Teramoto's advice, he started in December, 1908, to return to Lhasa, there to take the government into his own hands, and so to meet Chinese objections with the *fait accompli.* He reached Kumbum in February, 1909, met Kozloff there, and remained some time, taking the opportunity to re-establish relations with Russia. A summons arrived from the new Government of China for the Dalai Lama to return to Peking; but he ignored it, and continued his journey to Lhasa, where he arrived in December, 1909. He found Chinese influence strongly established there; the attitude of the Chinese Resident was hostile and arrogant, suggesting that China resented the Dalai Lama's presence in his own capital. News then arrived that General Chao was advancing on Lhasa. Zerempil ascertained that Chao had accused the Dalai Lama to Peking of treason, and of having concluded a secret treaty with Russia. He warned the Dalai Lama that he was in danger, and advised him to withdraw before the advancing Chinese troops. The Dalai Lama immediately asked the Amban for an explanation of these reports, but, only receiving evasive replies, he realized his danger, and determined to escape to neutral ground, where he would be free to carry on his plans. While preparations were being made, a Chinese mounted infantry detachment burst into Lhasa and endeavoured to capture the Tibetan ministers; they received warning in time to hide themselves. The Dalai Lama, accompanied by Teramoto, left Lhasa the same night with his immediate following and an escort, to make for the Indian frontier, and place himself under British protection. As immediate pursuit by Chao was to be feared, the greatest secrecy and haste was necessary. To throw the Chinese off the scent, Teramoto had organized the flight in two groups. The larger group, avoiding all concealment, marched north from Lhasa, taking a sedan chair in which was a high Lama; all was arranged to give the impression that the Dalai Lama was making for Kumbum. Meanwhile the second group, with the Dalai Lama well

mounted, went south with all secrecy, across the Tsangpo, avoided Gyantse, which was occupied by Chinese troops, and marched by Yamdok lake, Kangmar, and Phari to the Jelep Pass on the Indian frontier.

As soon as Chao received the news he took steps to intercept the flight. He could not arrest the Dalai Lama until authority was received from Peking. After the first day's march of the party that had gone north from Lhasa, a strong Chinese force came up with it, and on the next day the Chinese commander stopped the caravan, and ordered an immediate return to Lhasa, declaring the supposed Dalai Lama and his companions to be prisoners. The caravan obeyed without resistance, and only in the evening did the Chinese discover that they had been duped. The pursuit of the real Dalai Lama was then taken up by a force of 2,000 men. Parties were despatched by three separate roads—by the Karkhang Pass to Tashigong, by Lhakang to Lingtsi, and finally by Phari on Siliguri, the road used by the English in their march on Lhasa. The pursuers were met by armed resistance at the Kharo Pass and at the Tsangpo ferry, and found every obstacle put in their path. The rear of the Dalai Lama's party was covered by his bodyguard. Phari was reached on February 17, 1910, and the Jelep Pass crossed soon after. The Chinese in hot pursuit reached the frontier while the party was still in sight, and in spite of warning shots fired by the Indian frontier post, made a dash to capture the Dalai Lama. They were, however, driven back by the bodyguard and the British frontier guards, and the Dalai Lama reached the British fort in safety. The baffled Chinese took cruel vengeance on the Tibetans who had aided the escape. The Dalai Lama, under the protection of the British Government, reached Darjiling on February 27, 1910. The Chinese Government declared him to be deposed. Teramoto organized propaganda among all Buddhists against the Chinese for the humiliation and injury done by them to the head of the Buddhist faith. The British Government treated the Dalai Lama with the greatest consideration and, while remaining neutral, made strong representations to China about their action. The Russian Government formally protested against the deposition of the Dalai Lama, and threatened to occupy Kuldja. The Chinese Government were also in great anxiety lest Japan should take the opportunity to bring pressure to bear upon them for her political ends. Thus China's action recoiled on her own head, and the Dalai Lama, though in exile, was in a by no means unfavourable situation. The Government of China even went so far as to address to him on June 2, 1910, a conciliatory note inviting him to return to Lhasa. He refused, however, to accept their vague assurances. He thought it more politic to play the rôle of an injured potentate who, though compulsorily exiled from his country, was humbly content with his present lot.

After the occupation of Lhasa, Chao installed a Chinese administration, and was occupied in settling Chinese time-expired soldiers on the land with money appropriated from the Tibetan treasury, when the revolution broke out in China. The news spread fast. The Dalai Lama, Zerempil and Aguan Dorji realized with joy that at last the opportunity had come for their long planned coup. While the Dalai Lama was kept informed by the English Government and Press about the progress of the revolution, and its reflex action on Tibet, Zerempil gave the signal for revolt in Eastern Tibet, and, changing his quarters from Kumbum to Labrang monastery on the upper Yangtse kiang, directed operations from there. The arms and munitions deposited in Eastern Tsaidam were distributed.

In Lhasa Chao took vigorous measures to nip the revolt in the bud, but monks and people rose and forced him upon the defensive. The Amban was killed: the Chinese garrisons of Gyantse, Shigatse, and Tingri were overpowered, and the rest of the Chinese fled eastwards in panic. The line of retreat of Chao's army was cut, the fortified camps on his communications surprised, and the garrisons annihilated. There was panic and despair among the Chinese colonists settled by Chao. The Tashi Lama had declared war on China. By the middle of October, 1911, the Tibetans had driven the Chinese out of the country south of the Tang La Mountains, while from Litang the rising progressed in concert with the revolution in China itself, where the Republic was proclaimed on October 15. Zerempil moved his headquarters from Labrang to near Tatsienlu to co-operate with the Chinese revolutionaries. By December Szechuen was in the hands of the Kuomingtan party, and General Chao had been killed in the streets of Chengtu. The Dalai Lama had in the meantime moved from Calcutta to Kalimpong to be in close touch with Tibet, and to be ready to return to Lhasa at the right moment. Time worked in his favour, and eventually the Chinese Government in a solemn decree restored him to his former rights and dignities. Although Lhasa was now free from the Chinese, the Dalai Lama wished to await important news from Urga before returning to his capital. He had sent Aguan Dorji there to effect a reconciliation with the Hutuktu, his Mongolian rival. Aguan Dorji had worked for a year with Russian help to bring about an agreement which was signed in January, 1913, regulating the relations between Mongolia and Tibet. An Anglo-Russian agreement followed in February, by which Mongolia was recognized as being under Russian influence, and Tibet under British. The way being now clear, the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa amid great rejoicings. Aguan Dorji joined him there, replacing Teramoto as his chief adviser, and restoring Russian influence to his counsels. Negotiations conducted between England, China, and Tibet resulted in an agreement signed in Simla in July, 1914, to the effect that while China is nominal suzerain

of Tibet, the latter has the right to her own autonomous administrations. Chinese powers of interference in Tibet were strictly limited. At the same time an abortive attempt was made to define the eastern boundary of Tibet.

The Dalai Lama under English influence reorganized the administration, making many reforms, setting the finances in order, laying telegraph lines, and encouraging scientific development of the resources of the country by foreign help. His progressive attitude aroused strong opposition from the conservative elements of the country, especially the monasteries. When the Dalai Lama had just re-established himself as master in Tibet, and Central Asian problems were approaching solution, the Great War broke out. Russia, in accordance with an agreement concluded with Japan two years before, withdrew her troops from Siberia. China seized the opportunity which the embarrassments of Russia, England and Japan gave her to strengthen her position in Mongolia, and in Central Asia generally. The attention of the Government of India was fully occupied elsewhere; Afghanistan concluded a treaty with Turkey; risings in Northern India and on the north-west frontier, as well as internal conspiracies, had to be suppressed by force of arms.

At the end of 1915 China offered the Imperial Crown to Yuan shi Kai, but that far-seeing statesman was too wise to accept it with so much trouble in view. He knew that the revolt in Tibet was encouraged by Great Britain and Japan, and that China had to reckon upon British hostility to her policy in Central Asia. Rebellion then broke out in Southern China, and the country was torn by civil war, in the course of which Yuan shi Kai died.

In 1917 came the Russian revolution; and China joined the Allies against Germany.

Zerempil, meanwhile, was still engaged against the Chinese in Eastern Tibet with success that was in some measure due to the co-operation of the British agent. Welcome as this help was, Zerempil was puzzled that it should be given just at the time when China had joined the Allies in the World War. Coupling this fact with reports that hundreds of thousands of Asiatics were being sent to Europe to take part in a war in which they had no real concern, he inferred that Europeans would not scruple to use Asiatics as pawns in their rivalry against one another, and his former respect for European integrity suffered great disillusionment.

The Great War was approaching its end. The empire of the Czar crumbled. Kerenski's renewed offensive failed, and in November, 1917, Lenin and Trotsky proclaimed the Soviet Republic. In March, 1918, the treaty of Brest Litovsk was concluded. Russia seceded from the Allies, and to Zerempil in Eastern Tibet it seemed that the Allies' cause was at a low ebb. News soon followed of disaster to the Central

Powers; the Macedonian front broken; the falling away of Bulgaria; Turkey forced to surrender; the failure of the U-boat campaign; and the final collapse.

In the meantime, the Soviet system established in Russia had spread eastwards into Asia. Soviet Republics were founded in Turkestan in May, 1918, and at Omsk in Western Siberia in June.

News of the movement reached Zerempil in the Tibetan borderland. He did not know what to make of it, and was surprised at seeing how it was welcomed by Asiatic peoples under European rule. On the other hand, he heard from the British Agent that from all parts help was coming to the adherents of Czarist Russia in their fight against Bolshevism. He was bewildered and uneasy. He longed to be free to return to Lhasa and consult with Dorji. He vowed to remain true to his old Russian home, and to devote his strength to fighting her new enemy.

He had not long to wait; Tsiamdo, the last stronghold of the Chinese in further Tibet, fell; China had neither men nor money to prosecute the struggle.

Zerempil returned to Lhasa and was given a triumphal reception, as the liberator of the country. Under pressure from England and Japan, China was induced to modify the existing Anglo-Chinese Treaty in favour of Tibetan independence. The Dalai Lama wished to make Zerempil Commander-in-Chief and Foreign Minister, but he found existing conditions in Lhasa distasteful, regarding the prevalence of British influence as a danger to the country and a setback to his Russian friends. He refused the honours offered to him, in favour of his old friend Tsarong.

Aguan Dorji and Zerempil were in a dilemma. The fact that Great Britain opposed Bolshevism inclined them to favour it, but at the same time this same Bolshevism had brought Czarist Russia, England's old opponent, to the ground. On the one hand Bolshevism promised freedom to the oppressed peoples of Asia; on the other hand, it ridiculed their treasured religion as "an opiate for the people."

Zerempil was glad when the Dalai Lama ordered him on a mission to Urga. Aguan Dorji told him that he might expect to see there Colonel Ignatieff, former head of the Intelligence Branch of the General Staff in St. Petersburg. In November, 1918, Zerempil reached Urga and met Ignatieff. The old Czarist officer, in intimate conversation, explained to him the shame of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, making Russia a traitor to her Allies; told him that the old Russia refused to recognize it, and was determined to mobilize Asiatic nations against the enemy; that envoys had been sent to Turkestan, Tibet, and Mongolia, and that in Siberia a strong army of old Czarist Russians had been formed. Ignatieff invited Zerempil to join the Intelligence Service of this army, of which he himself was the chief. Zerempil gladly consented.

Ignatieff confided to him the plan for a great offensive against Moscow in the spring of 1919, in which armies under Denikin, Yudenitch, and Koltchak were to co-operate. Throughout the winter Zerempil helped in the organization of Koltchak's army.

In May, 1919, Koltchak, full of confidence, commenced the advance towards Moscow without waiting for the co-operation of Denikin's army. In the meantime the Soviet Red army had been organized and trained with vigour and enthusiasm. Koltchak realized too late that he had underestimated their strength. Kameneff, a distinguished old Czarist officer, was appointed to command the Red army. He inflicted a crushing defeat upon Koltchak. Zerempil was taken prisoner and interned at Moscow. A conflict arose in the camp between the old Czarist officers and the rank and file. It resulted in the officers being led out to execution, while the men, Zerempil among them, were liberated. He met old friends serving on the Staff of the Red army whom he had known in old days on the Staff in St. Petersburg, and learnt with astonishment of the efficiency of the Red army. A former acquaintance, now a Soviet officer, introduced him to a man plainly dressed in workman's costume, who asked him whether he would serve Russia under its new circumstances against her old enemy, the British, in Central Asia. He agreed, and found that the enquirer was none other than Trotsky himself.

Under the influence of Bolshevik propaganda, Zerempil became enthusiastic for the cause, and bitterly reproached himself that, in ignorance of the real facts, he had served Koltchak, who was supported by Entente money and armed by England and France against the real Russian people. He vowed that in future he would serve the new Russia against her old adversary, England. On the Staff of the Red army he found many old colleagues with whom he had worked upon Central Asian problems in days long past, especially Trubchaninoff and Kollossoff. He was first employed with the Red cavalry against the communications of Denikin's army that was now threatening Moscow from the south. When the Red army under Kameneff had disposed of Koltchak and Denikin, Zerempil willingly gave his services for employment in Central Asia for the furtherance of the Bolshevist policy of freeing the oppressed peoples from the yoke of Imperialist Powers and stimulating their newly awakened national consciousness. At the end of 1921 he left Moscow for Lhasa with material for propaganda, presents for the Dalai Lama, and letters for Aguan Dorji.

At the border of the Lhasa district he was surprised at being stopped by a Tibetan outpost, who, while permitting him, as a brother Buddhist, to pass unmolested, warned him that entrance to Tibet was forbidden "by the Great Ruler of India." So in Lhasa he found that the Dalai Lama was no longer the real ruler, but the British Agent with a military camarilla, while the English General Pereira was

installed in a house in the western suburb. The Tibetan commander, an octogenarian general, could do nothing without first getting the approval of the British Agent. The Dalai Lama himself was entirely submissive to the British, and Aguan Dorji had, under British pressure, been sent away to Mongolia. Tsarong, who had not been previously compromised with Russia, was the most influential Tibetan personality, and Teramoto was at his side. Zerempil took the place of Dorji in the Dalai Lama's councils, and tactfully acquiesced in the existing order. He even cultivated relations with the British officials, who won his respect in spite of his prejudices in favour of their Russian rival. The Dalai Lama, by his intimacy with the British, had come to realize that progress and culture could only be acquired by opening Tibet to foreign influences. His modern ideas, however, brought him into conflict with the conservative and reactionary priesthood. These divisions weakened the administration, and caused discontent, which even led to revolt in some parts of the country. Zerempil felt that disaster was impending, and sought means to free his master from British influence. The British had warned the Dalai Lama against Soviet Russia, and Zerempil felt that he alone was helpless to plead the cause of the latter. Finding that he could do no good, he returned in 1923 to Moscow, and there made a report of his impressions in Lhasa. He felt bitterly his estrangement from the Dalai Lama, and the English domination of Lhasa to the exclusion of his beloved Russia; on the other hand, attracted as he was by the Soviet dreams of freedom, he could not associate himself with a system that involved contempt and suppression of the religion which ruled his life.

Politics and religion, he concluded, were incompatible, and with a heavy heart he resolved to abandon all political activity and devote himself to his religion. Thus at least he could remain true to the great Head of his Faith. While a few weeks later Eastern Tibet was in a welter of internecine strife, and lawlessness and unrest prevailed in all Tibet, a small monastery in Mongolia received Zerempil within its doors, there to await, in service to his great Protector, the hour of universal deliverance.